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Social Media Platforms and Free
Expression: An Introduction
Eric J. Segall
On Friday, October 8, 2021, the Mercer Law Review hosted a virtual
Symposium on “Social Media Platforms and Free Expression.” This
important topic could not be timelier. With the Right calling for
regulation of Facebook and Twitter in order to stop the removal of
conservatives from their platforms,1 to the direct effect of social media
on our elections and our politics,2 the worldwide spread of this
technology has brought with it new and difficult legal issues regarding
freedom of expression and social harms. Congratulations to the Mercer
Law Review for addressing these controversial and complex questions.
Professor Gary Simson’s presentation suggested that the
combination of this new technology regarding expression and the
elasticity of free speech rules do not provide easy answers to the legality
of government attempts to regulate the internet.3 Professor Simson
summarized some of the grave dangers caused by the instant
availability of expression of all forms on a worldwide basis. Two of the
many problems posed by this new technology are the use of social media
platforms by wrongdoers to cultivate hatred and negative stereotypes
against vulnerable groups and the use of these platforms by many
different organizations and people to confuse and mislead the public on


Ashe Family Chair Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Emory
University (B.A., 1980); Vanderbilt University Law School (J.D., 1983). Member,
Vanderbilt Law Review (1981–1983); Research Editor (1982–1983). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. See Mark Macarthy, Justice Thomas Sends a Message on Social Media Regulation
(Apr. 9, 2021), BROOKINGS, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/04/09/justicethomas-sends-a-message-on-social-media-regulation/.
2. See Hayleigh Moore & Mia Hinckle, Social Media’s Impact on the 2020
Presidential Election: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Nov. 3, 2020), UNIVERSITY OF
MARYLAND,
https://spac.umd.edu/news/story/social-mediarsquos-impact-on-the-2020presidential-election-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly.
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important matters of public policy. Professor Simson argued that it is
time for the Supreme Court of the United States to reconsider some of
its more rigid free speech doctrines to accommodate the need to battle
the negative aspects of social media while also maintaining a robust
commitment to the freedoms of speech, expression, and association.
Professor RonNell Andersen Jones discussed the issues surrounding
Justice Gorsuch and Thomas’ recent suggestions that the Court
reconsider the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan.4 This
decision required that public officials, and as held in subsequent
opinions, public figures, must show actual malice or a reckless
disregard of the truth before prevailing in a defamation suit. Professor
Jones suggested that some critics of the case, other than the Justices,
are concerned about the threats to democracy that have accompanied
widespread social media disinformation.5 But Professor Jones argued
that this threat is not a Sullivan problem and reconsideration of
Sullivan is also not a solution. This is because much of the falsity on
social media is not defamatory. In any event, to the extent social media
publishes wholly invented, consciously distributed lies, that material
already falls outside the scope of Sullivan protection. Additionally, it is
not a good idea for our country to try and tackle the misinformation
crisis through time-consuming, expensive, complicated libel litigation
against the major disinformation purveyors, who are entities that are
often anonymous and judgment-proof. Professor Jones concluded that
reconsidering Sullivan would stifle important speech and materially
harm the marketplace of ideas while not being an effective weapon
against dangerous and false internet speech.
In this volume the first article, by Professor Jon Garon, focuses on
social media and the rights and difficulties of minors.6 He astutely
points out that young people today must navigate all the obstacles
children have always faced plus this new interconnected world.
Observing that teenagers, even before the pandemic, spend so much
time both in school and at home online, he suggests that legal doctrine
has not kept pace with technological advancements. His paper discusses
many important issues regarding the legal rights of minors both inside
and outside of school and suggests that we need to display more
empathy towards our children and rethink how our institutions handle

4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. RonNell Andersen Jones, Should N.Y. Times v. Sullivan be Reconsidered?,
DIGITAL COMMONS, https://guides.lawl.mercer.edu/mlr (forthcoming).
6. Jon Garon, To Be Seen But Not Heard: How the Internet’s Negative Impact on
Minors’ Constitutional Right to Privacy, Speech, and Autonomy Creates a Need for
Empathy-by-Design, Lead Articles, 73 MERCER L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2022).
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unique issues involving our future generations. This article provides an
excellent look into how social media positively and negatively affects
our children’s lives and how the law needs to deal with these perplexing
issues.
Professor András Koltay, a legal scholar from Budapest, brings a
valuable perspective to the Mercer Law Review Lead Articles Edition.7
He lays bare many of the differences between how other western
Democracies handle free speech questions and the almost free-speech
absolutism imposed on America by the Supreme Court. Pointing out
that in many other countries social media platforms are required to
take down certain forms of speech, such as defamation, when they are
notified of such speech, he compares that legal regime to the law in
America where these platforms are actually immunized for any
damages caused by harmful speech on their websites. Politicians, legal
scholars, judges, and all invested parties in our country should pay
much closer attention than they are now doing to how other free
societies balance freedom of expression with the harms social media
platforms cause. Professor Koltay’s excellent comparative article is a
wonderful place to start.
Professor Seth Oranburg’s article argues that Congress should repeal
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,8 and its immunity for
social media platforms.9 This federal law provides immunity to Twitter,
Facebook, and other social media companies from lawsuits for illegal
speech on their websites. Focusing on the role social media played in
facilitating the January 6, 2021 Capitol Riots, Professor Oranburg
points out that these companies pick and choose the speech on their
platforms through complicated algorithms that tend to emphasize
negative news and also encourage people to divide into polarized
groups. These giant corporations are also crowding out more
responsible local media and other less divisive sources of news and
discussions. The immunity created by § 230, according to Oranburg,
increases these harms while providing little benefit to the American
public. Recognizing that the complete removal of § 230 immunity might
harm small companies that do in fact facilitate helpful debate and
robust political discussion, Oranburg suggests limiting § 230 immunity

7. Andras Koltay, The Protection of Freedom of Expression from Social Media
Platforms, Lead Articles, 73 MERCER L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2022).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
9. Seth Oranburg, Social Media and Democracy after the Capitol Riot, or, A
Cautionary Tale of the Giant Goldfish, Lead Articles, 73 MERCER L. REV. (forthcoming
Mar. 2022).
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to a smaller group of websites and maybe even only for not-for-profit
corporations.
Professor Russell Weaver’s article concerns the combination of § 230
immunity for social media platforms and their power to censor speech.10
He believes that allowing these websites to decide who gets to speak—
while also providing them with immunity for that speech—is an
unfortunate combination. Professor Weaver uses our long history of
encouraging freedom of speech and expression to support his legal
arguments. But Professor Weaver is also justifiably concerned with
treating these speech producing companies as common carriers and
requiring them to allow all speech on their platforms which might by
itself violate the First Amendment.11 His tentative and interesting
suggestion is to give these companies a choice: accept § 230 immunity
and allow all speech unless it is not protected by the First Amendment
or, if they want censorial control, to give up their immunity.
Congratulations again to the Mercer Law Review, and the professors
who presented and wrote about such thought-provoking articles on a
difficult, sensitive, and timely topic. I have no doubt this Issue of the
Mercer Law Review will provide much-needed help to the lawyers,
judges, and politicians who are wrestling with the complexity of social
medial regulation as well as anyone else interested in this important
national and international debate.

10. Russel Weaver, Social Media, Section 230, and Free Expression, Lead Articles, 73
MERCER L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2022).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

